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North Caucasus: 
the Russian Gordian knot 
The key problems and conflicts
in the region and the effect
thereof on the future of Russia
Maciej Falkowski
Theses
1. North Caucasus is the most instable part of
the Russian Federation: since the early 90’s, the-
re has been going on the military conflict in Che-
chnya, which is gradually spilling over into the
other republics of the region, terrorism seems to
have occupied its regular position in the political
life of Caucasus, organised crime is flourishing,
the tension persists there and military incidents
and attacks are breaking out every now and
again. During the recent year, the destabilisation
of the region, which affects many fields of Russian
political and social life, has grown to an alar-
ming size. 
2. There are many reasons for the instability in
the region; they stem from numerous political,
religious and socioeconomic problems and con-
flicts. They all overlap, interweave and create 
a complex network. The most difficult problem
is the war in Chechnya, lasting since the early
90’s, which is spilling over the neighbouring re-
publics, takes increasingly more drastic shapes
and poses a threat to the security and stability of
the entire country. The conflict stimulates dan-
gerous tendencies and processes all over Cauca-
sus: it is one of the reasons for the intensifying
anti-Russian sentiments in the local communities,
and it accelerates their drifting towards radical
Islam, etc. Moreover, the region is a scene of nu-
merous ethnic conflicts (the conflicts in Dage-
stan, the western part of Caucasus, the Ingush-
-Ossetian conflict), religious (mainly inside Islam)
and conflicts between the indigenous Russian
people and immigrants from Caucasus and Cen-
tral Asia in Stavropol and Krasnodar Krais as well
as acute socioeconomic problems (poverty, un-
employment, overpopulation, growing crime). 
3. Since the collapse of the USSR, the Kremlin has
failed to frame a consistent and long-term con-
cept for development of North Caucasus and its
integration with the rest of Russia. The Russian
authorities’ policy towards Caucasus is limited to
emergency actions, responding to crises instead
of preventing them. It consists in abortive
attempts to liquidate the effects of negative ten-
dencies and events and not on counteracting the
causes thereof. The authorities are still making
the same mistakes, unwilling to recognise their
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obvious failures. The key elements of the policy
include: preventing any interference of other
countries and international organisations in the
region, conducting the “antiterrorist operation”,
supporting the puppet regimes in particular re-
publics, marginalisation of the opposition and the
far-flung propaganda in the mass media, which
shows a false picture of the reality. A great role
in the Caucasian policy of the Kremlin is played
by law enforcement structures, whose interests
often collide with the interests of the Russian
state. Such a policy does not lead to resolving
problems and conflicts, on the contrary, it leads
to deepening and escalation thereof.
4. The future of North Caucasus depends on
either settlement or worsening of the existing
problems; if they intensify, Caucasus will be
plunging in chaos. The instability in the region
is accompanied by further-reaching processes,
i.e. gradual drifting apart of Caucasus from Rus-
sia, its derussification and increasingly faster
Islamisation. Such tendencies, which in the pros-
pect of several decades could end in a high degree
of autonomy or even separation of the region
from the Russian Federation, could be slowed
down through working out of a comprehensive
concept for development of the region. However,
for the time being, the Kremlin has neither poli-
tical will nor ability to develop and implement
such a concept: the main reasons for that are the
views of the Russian ruling elites and the general
condition of the Russian state (the lack of suffi-
cient financial means, lack of proper staff, resis-
tance of the law enforcement structures, dege-
neration of the state structures, etc.). 
5. North Caucasus is a region where many serious
problems are concentrated. The future of Russia
will depend on their resolution (the Chechen war,
other ethnic and religious conflicts, rapid growth
of non-Russian and Muslim population, decreasing
number of ethnic Russians, etc.). So long as Mos-
cow is unable to resolve them, Russia will be an
unpredictable and instable country, in danger of
terrorism and convulsed by internal conflicts.
Unless the Kremlin copes with the issue of Cau-
casus, it will not be possible for Russia to enter
on the path of democratic reform, to make the
attempt to create a modern country, open to glo-
bal cooperation. Caucasus is today a source of
disintegration of the Russian state, of its struc-
tures and society; unless this is held back, in the
longer term, it may become a source of its col-
lapse. Russia’s position in the post-Soviet area and,
above all, in South Caucasus will also depend on
the way the situation in North Caucasus develops.
Introduction
This paper is meant to systematise and describe
the complex political, social, religious and eco-
nomic situation in the region, above all, the key
problems and conflicts, which give rise to the re-
gional destabilisation. In our analysis of the cau-
ses of instability in North Caucasus and of the
Kremlin’s policy in the region we will try to ans-
wer the question about the future of the Russian
Caucasus and the influence of the processes and
tendencies existing there on the future of Russia. 
I. The key problems of the
region
North Caucasus is situated in the southern part
of the Russian Federation, between the Black and
Caspian Seas. In the south, it borders on Georgia
and Azerbaijan, which together with Armenia
form South Caucasus1. North Caucasus consists
of eight autonomous republics, which are main-
ly inhabited by indigenous Caucasian peoples
(Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia,
Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Adyge-
ya and Kalmykia) and the Stavropol and Krasno-
dar Krais (where Russians are a majority)2. [For
detailed characteristics of the republics and krais
see the annex].
North Caucasus is characterised by a multitude
and complexity of problems and conflicts exist-
ing there. They overlap, interweave and create 
a difficult to describe complicated network. Often,
sources of one conflict can be found in another,
and solution to a given problem is impossible
without finding a way out from another. For
instance, it is impossible to analyse the internal
situation in Dagestan or Ingushetia without con-
sidering the situation in Chechnya; likewise it is
difficult to understand the ethnic problems of
the region without analysing the socioeconomic
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situation. Therefore, to understand the complex
situation in the entire North Caucasus and to iden-
tify the sources of instability there, it is necessary
to systematise the problems which we have to
deal with and to briefly describe each of them. 
1. The war in Chechnya
The most serious problem of the region is the
military conflict in Chechnya, lasting since the
early 90’s, the consequences of which affect not
only North Caucasus but also Russia as a whole.
The Chechen war is a conflict between the me-
tropolis and the periphery aspiring to indepen-
dence (for this reason it is often referred to as an
anti-colonial war), which has risen out of the
still remembered bitter events of the past (the
conquest of Chechnya by Russia in the 19th cen-
tury, the Tsarist and Soviet repressions aimed
against Chechens, etc.). To justify its policy of
force in the republic, the Kremlin attempts to
place the events in Chechnya in the context of
fight against international terrorism, while in
fact the source and main reason for the conflict
is the Chechen separatism, the striving of
Chechens to leave the Russian Federation and
create a state of their own. 
1.1. The conflict in 1991–1999
The conflict broke out in autumn 1990, when the
delegates gathered at the 1st Congress of the Che-
chen Nation announced separation of Chechnya
from the USSR and proclaimed its independence.
A year later (August 1991), the so-called Chechen
revolution broke out (the abolishment of the com-
munist authorities in Grozny by supporters of in-
dependence), during which gen. Jokhar Dudayev
reached out for power (he was elected president
in November 1991). After the retreat of the Rus-
sian army from Chechnya (1992), the republic
gained real independence. The economic blockade
imposed on Chechnya by Moscow and attempts
to abolish Dudayev with the usage of the oppo-
sition had proven unsuccessful, therefore the
Kremlin decided to launch a military interven-
tion in December 19943. 
The so-called first Chechen war had been lasting
until August 1996 and ended in a military and
political disaster for Russia. The federal forces
were not capable of defeating the Chechen guer-
rillas, who were supported by local civilians, and
the war was unpopular among the Russian pub-
lic; therefore president Boris Yeltsin, who was
seeking re-election, decided to conduct peace
negotiations with the separatist leaders. Under
the accords signed in Khasavyurt on 31 August
1996, Chechnya gained real independence (the
status of the republic was supposed to be deter-
mined during bilateral negotiations until 2001),
the federal troops were withdrawn from the re-
public and the power was again taken over by
the separatists4.
In January 1997 presidential election was held in
Chechnya. The winner was the Chechen chief of
staff Aslan Maskhadov5. The period of the second
quasi-independence of Chechnya (1996–1999),
during which the authorities in Grozny were
awkwardly trying to lay the foundations for the
Chechen state, was characterised by a constantly
worsening internal chaos. The mass unemploy-
ment, the material and moral consequences of
the war, the lack of any external support; all this
led to unprecedented increase in organised crime
(kidnappings for ransom, illegal trade in oil, guns,
drugs, etc.), and the weakness of the central
authorities contributed to the internal anarchy.
Quite soon a strong Islamic opposition grew in
Chechnya (its leaders being Shamil Basayev,
Movladi Udugov and Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev),
which, from 1998, started making demands for
Maskhadov’s stepping down as president and
transformation of the republic into an Islamic
state. The crisis in the republic reached its cli-
max in spring 1999, when the so-called Congress
of the Peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan was
held. The Chechen and Dagestani Islamic radicals
opted at the congress for uniting both republics
into an Islamic state by way military fight against
Russia6. 
1.2. The second Chechen war: 
from occupation to Chechenisation
The attack launched from the territory of Che-
chnya on Dagestan by Islamic activists led by Basa-
yev and Khattab in August and September 1999
and the series of terrorist attacks in Russian towns
(September 1999), which Chechens were accused
of, gave the Kremlin a pretext for making another
attempt to subjugate the rebel republic with the
usage of military means7. In the atmosphere of
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fear of subsequent attacks, heated by Russian pro-
paganda, and the anti-Chechen campaign in the
mass media, Vladimir Putin, who was Prime Mini-
ster at the time, terminated the Khasavyurt ac-
cords and promised launching an “antiterrorist
operation” in North Caucasus. Having dislodged
the militants from Dagestan, the Russian forces
started heavy bombardments of Chechnya and,
on 1 October 1999, they marched in the territo-
ry of the republic (the beginning of the military
operation caused mass escape of Chechen civilian
population; during the first months of the war,
nearly 350 thousand Chechens took shelter in
Ingushetia alone8). The so-called second Chechen
war, which then began, has not ended until now.
After several months of relentless fight (by
spring 2000), Russians managed to occupy the
entire Chechnya and defeat the key militant units,
who started on guerrilla warfare.
During the first two years (2000–2002) the con-
trol over the de facto occupied Chechnya was in
the hands of almost exclusively the federal army,
which reaped profits from oil trade, robbing the
local residents and other illegal sources if income,
violating human rights on a massive scale, which
had the features of homicide (mass murders,
rape, robbery, torture, trade in people, etc.)9. The
Kremlin started gradually, albeit insignificantly,
curtailing the powers of the military from mid
2002. That was an element of the so-called Che-
chenisation policy, the official objective of which
was the legalisation of the pro-Russian Chechen
authorities, while the unofficial one was chang-
ing the nature of the war from Russian-Chechen
into interchechen. As a part of the Chechenisa-
tion policy (the key figure of which was Akhmad
Kadyrov, chief of administration of the republic
and, from October 2003, president of Chechnya)
the powers of the pro-Russian authorities in Groz-
ny were gradually being increased, the Chechen
militia was created, a constitutional referendum
(March 2003) and presidential election (October
2003) were held in the republic, enlistment of
former militants into pro-Russian forces was
supported, etc. Such actions were accompanied
by a far-flung propaganda in the mass media,
with the usage of which attempts were made to
persuade the international opinion and the
Russian public that law and order had been re-
stored in Chechnya10.
In spite of the successful image of Chechenisa-
tion in the mass media, it soon appeared that it
could not bring the conflict in the republic nearer
to the end. The policy failed, which was also 
a bitter political defeat of president Putin, after
the 2004 events: death of president Akhmad Ka-
dyrov (on 9 May; as a result of his assassination
at the stadium in Grozny) and the whole series
of terrorist attacks organised by Chechen mili-
tants11. They proved that, contrary to what the
Kremlin was claiming, the guerrillas still had si-
gnificant forces and were able to destabilise the
situation in the entire region. Chechenisation
did not have any chance of success for several
reasons. Firstly, it was opposed by the Russian
army (the military think that the power in the
republic should not be handed over to Chechens),
for whom this meant weakening of their own
position in the republic and reduction of their
incomes from the businesses they were running
there12. Secondly, even the moderate militants
were not admitted to take part in the political
dialogue in Chechnya, which prevented any at-
tempt to settle the conflict at its source, i.e. the
Chechen separatism. Thirdly, the pro-Russian
authorities in the republic were (and still are)
made up of people who are only guided by the
interests of their own clan, whose only purpose is
to keep the power and get rich. Those individuals
commit crimes against their own nation; they
are hated and perceived as traitors by a vast ma-
jority of Chechens13.
Even though the Kremlin’s policy in Chechnya
leads to escalation of the conflict in the republic,
still nothing seems to indicate that it could be
changed in the nearest future. This year presi-
dential election, held on 29 August, in which Alu
Alkhanov, minister of internal affairs of Chechnya,
was elected to be Kadyrov’s successor, has proven
that the policy is being continued. 
1.3. The consequences of the war 
for Chechnya and for the entire region
Initially, the second Chechen war used to have 
a stabilising effect on North Caucasus. The deci-
sive actions of the Kremlin in the republic signifi-
cantly curtailed the quite strong separatist ten-
dencies and influence of radical Islam in the re-
gion. The uncompromising defeat of the mili-
tants enabled president Putin to have greater
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control over the local regimes and to get rid of
such inconvenient local leaders as e.g. president
of Ingushetia, Ruslan Aushev (1992–2001), who
was replaced by a general of Federal Security Ser-
vice Murat Ziazikov. The war had also caused fur-
ther erosion of the Caucasian community spirit:
while during the first war, Chechens had been
popular and had enjoyed common sympathy in
the region, starting from 1999, most of residents
of Caucasus began to believe Chechens were the
main culprits of their own troubles, which trans-
lated into acceptance of the military solution to
the Chechen problem. 
However, as the conflict in North Caucasus drag-
ged out, there intensified socio-political processes
that caused serious destabilisation of the situa-
tion in the region and extending military actions
over other Caucasian republics (first of all, Ingu-
shetia and Dagestan). Such processes concerned:
the Chechen separatist camp, the Chechen socie-
ty and residents of other Muslim republics in
Caucasus. 
Two very significant changes took place in the
militants’ camp: radicalisation of the war con-
ducting methods and changes in the ideology
followed by the guerrillas. In the military field,
the separatists started using terrorist methods
(including suicide attacks) and started to bring
their military actions out of the territory of Che-
chnya14. While, initially, president Maskhadov
was against carrying out military actions out-
side of Chechnya, now, even he started threaten-
ing Russia with attacks all over its territory
(though he still condemns terrorism)15. In terms
of ideology, noticeable is the turn from nationa-
lism towards Islamic ideology among both radi-
cals and moderate Chechens. At the beginning of
the current war, most of the militant comman-
ders claimed they were fighting first of all for in-
dependence, followed the idea of a secular de-
mocratic state and were oriented to the West,
counting on its support. As the war stretched
on, their views were evolving towards radical
Islam: today, a significant part of the militants
are fighting not under the independence slogans
but under Islamic slogans16.
Since the beginning of the second war in Che-
chnya, significant changes have also taken place
in the Chechen society. The anti-Russian senti-
ments are extremely intense; most of Chechens
do not consider themselves to be citizens of the
Russian Federation and perceive Russian soldiers
and representatives of the authorities as occu-
piers. This concerns both those Chechens who
sympathise with the militants and those who for-
mally represent the pro-Russian option. More-
over, the number of radical Islam supporters and
the religiousness level are constantly growing
among Chechens. Increasingly more residents of
Chechnya support or at least justify the radical
fight methods used by the Chechen commanders.
Such processes (anti-Russian sentiments, increa-
sed religiousness and radicalisation of views)
mainly concern the young generation, who were
growing up in the conditions of war and did not
get even primary education. The Russian culture
is strange to them and, unlike middle-aged peo-
ple, they do not feel attached to Russia and they
are not sentimental about the USSR. 
Similar processes are also taking place in other
Caucasian Muslim republics. They stem from the
deepening frustration about Moscow’s policy in
the region, which translates into increasing
sympathy and even support for Chechens. The
belief that it was the Chechens who were guilty
of provoking the conflict is slowly replaced by
accusing the Kremlin of unwillingness to end the
war and treating residents of Caucasus as second-
class citizens17. The radicalisation of sentiments
in Caucasus is also due to the transferring of the
methods used in the “anti-terrorist operation”
outside of Chechnya; particular unrest is caused
by the activity of the so-called Federal Security
Service death squadrons, who kidnap, take to
Chechnya, torture and often murder many inno-
cent people in Ingushetia and Dagestan18. Young
residents of Caucasus, seeing that they receive
nothing in exchange for their loyalty to Russia,
start supporting Chechens and joining their
troops. In Caucasus, noticeable is also significant
intensification of anti-Russian sentiments and in-
creasingly more radical Islamisation, in particu-
lar, among young people (including the young
elites of the region19). Islam is gradually becom-
ing a unifying factor for residents of the Muslim
republics of the region, which, seemingly, causes
revival of the idea of Caucasian solidarity, which
failed back in the 90’s. As a result of such pro-
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cesses, the Chechen war is gradually spilling
over the entire region, the region is destabilised
and non-Chechen guerrilla units, which organise
terrorist attacks in the south of Russia, propaga-
te separation of Caucasus from the Russian Fede-
ration and creation of an independent Islamic
state there, emerge20. Many things seem to indi-
cate that, unless the processes are slowed down,
Moscow will have to deal soon not with a Che-
chen war but with an all-Caucasian conflict21.
2. The ethnic conflicts
2.1. Dagestan: the land conflict
Dagestan is troubled by the greatest number of
ethnic conflicts, which additionally overlap with
the severe economic and social problems. The
basic problem is the conflict between the peo-
ples inhabiting the lowland and piedmont parts
of north Dagestan (i.e. Kumyks, Chechens-Akins,
Nogays and Russians) and the mountain peoples
(Avars, Dargins, Laks and others). Its sources
should be traced back to the policy of the Soviet
authorities, which, starting from the 50’s, had
been conducting mass displacements of people
from the highland regions down to the low-
lands. It was mainly the Avars (the largest ethnic
group of Dagestan), the Dargins and the Laks
who had been displaced and forced to settle in
the land of the Kumyks, Nogays, Russians and
Chechens. Some time later, the voluntary migra-
tion of highlanders down to the lowlands began
and it has been lasting until now. 
The conflicts between the highlanders and low-
landers existed already in the USSR times, yet
the totalitarian Soviet system kept them under
control. Perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet
Union caused national revival in Dagestan and
uncovering of the so far hidden ethnic conflicts,
the basis for which was a clash of economic in-
terests. The situation was aggravated by the eco-
nomic crisis, which affected North Caucasus much
stronger than other parts of the former empire.
The national movements of Kumyks, Nogays,
Chechens and the Russian population started
making demands for curtailing the settlement of
the highland peoples on the lowlands and even
for return of the land that had been taken away
from them by the authorities. In turn, Avars,
Dargins and Laks started forming military units,
threatening they would use force, if any attempts
to remove them from the land occupied by them
were made. The conflict between Chechens-Akins
and the Avar and Lak peoples in western Dage-
stan is particularly bitter. In 1944, Chechens,
who had lived there, were deported to Central
Asia, their “national” (Aukhovskiy) district was
liquidated, and Avar and Lak settlers came to
replace the Chechen population. In the late 80’s,
the Chechen national movement demanded re-
storation of the Aukhovskiy district and displa-
cement of the Laks and Avars from there, which
met with determined resistance of the latter22. 
Although the ethnic conflicts in Dagestan had
many a time dangerously aggravated (especially
in the 90’s), the situation never ran out of con-
trol and each time open clashes were luckily
avoided. Still, none of the ethnic problems linked
to land conflicts has been resolved, which causes
that they can escalate any time; and this will de-
stabilise the situation in the republic23.
2.2. Dagestan: the fight for power
There is constant fierce rivalry between the par-
ticular ethnic groups of Dagestan for power and
influence in the republic. Since the late 80’s, the
power has been concentrated around the Dargin
clan led by the 74-year-old Magomedali Mago-
medov, the Chairman of the State Council. Some
Kumyk and Avar clans are allied to him, while
the opposition core is made up of Avars, Lezgins
and Laks. Neither representatives of the authori-
ties (they are mainly former communist appa-
ratchiks and people who have criminal past) nor
most of the opposition members follow any ide-
ology or have any clear political views or pro-
grammes. Their main motivations include striv-
ing for power, getting rich and dominating the
other ethnic groups. Politicians who offer any
concrete political programmes, make appeals for
reconstruction of the socio-political life in the
republic or those who enjoy actual prestige in
the republic are systematically liquidated by
either the authorities or the criminal groups
connected with the authorities24.
Until mid 2004, the political fight was unofficial:
it was not mentioned publicly; instead the
alleged “friendship between the peoples of the
republic” was manifested on the outside. The
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main method of elimination of the opponents
was political murder (of which radical Islamists
were usually accused) or their intimidation and
forcing them to leave Dagestan, and not elections,
which were notoriously fixed. The strongest
trump card of the clan of Magomedov, which let
him keep the power in Makhachkala for such 
a long time, was the support of the Kremlin,
which in exchange for loyalty and support to its
own policy in Caucasus gave him carte blanche to
conduct his internal policy25. 
The situation in the republic changed when the
new constitution was adopted as a result of the
2003 referendum (the collective State Council
was liquidated and the post of the president of
the republic was introduced; the first presiden-
tial election has been scheduled for 2006). The
new constitution shook the previous system of
power distribution in the republic, which, despite
its fragility, has never turned into an open mili-
tary conflict. The main division line has emerged
between Magomedov and the Dargin and Kumyk
activists, who support him, and Avar and Lezgin
politicians26. Although blood has not been shed
in Dagestan as yet, as the election is drawing
nearer, the situation is getting increasingly tenser,
and there is real danger that an ethnic conflict
will break out. The situation is additionally com-
plicated by the proximity to Chechnya, activation
of the Islamic opposition in Dagestan and the fact
that every Dagestani politician has a several-
thousand-strong, well-armed unit of militants at
his disposal27.
2.3. Dagestan: the Lezgin question
When the USSR broke up, the Lezgin, who inhabi-
ted southern Dagestan and northern Azerbaijan,
were artificially separated by the state border.
The Lezgin national movement, which emerged
then, was advocating unification of the Lezgin
territories and creation of one Lezgistan as a part
of Russia. This aroused anxiety in Azerbaijan,
whose authorities feared that Russia, which was
striving for maintaining its influence in South
Caucasus, could use the Lezgin question to de-
stabilise the internal situation in their country.
Lezgins have many a time protested against the
tightening of the Russian-Azeri border, which
makes life more difficult for inhabitants of the
frontier. There have also happened several clashes
between the Lezgin population and Azeri border
guards. Even though the Lezgin issue has notice-
ably relented since the late 90’s, still it remains
a very serious potential source of tension in south
Dagestan (inter alia in Derbent, inhabited by Lez-
gins and Azeris) as well as in the relations be-
tween Russia and Azerbaijan28.
2.4. The Ingush-Ossetian conflict
The tension between Ossetians, who are mem-
bers Orthodox Christians and speak a language
belonging to the Iranian branch, and Ingushes,
who are Muslims and are closely related to Che-
chens, has existed since 1992. In that year, the
two peoples engaged in a brief military conflict:
as a result of fights for the so-called prigorodnyi
district (the suburbs of Vladikavkaz) more than
800 people were killed and nearly 30 thousand
Ingushes escaped from Ossetia to Ingushetia
(most of them still live in refugee camps)29. The
enmity between the two nations, manifesting
itself inter alia in their mutual, almost total, iso-
lation, has not eased, even though more than 12
years have passed since the end of the clashes.
Moreover, following the tragic terrorist attack in
Beslan, in which many Ingushes took part, re-
escalation of the conflict cannot be excluded (the
public opinion in Ossetia blames Ingushes for
organising the attack)30.
The Ingush-Ossetian conflict is so bitter for seve-
ral reasons: its protraction, failure to sign a com-
promise peace accord after the 1992 fights (the
conflict ended in a ceasefire, forced by Moscow),
the negative effects of the war in Chechnya, the
growing cultural and civilisation-related differ-
ences between the secularized Ossetia and the
fast-Islamising Ingushetia, and the demographic
processes (Ingushetia has the greatest popula-
tion growth rate in the Russian Federation, while
in Ossetia it is much lower).
Another outbreak of fights between Ingushes and
Ossetians would have very negative consequen-
ces for Moscow, mainly due to the fact that both
republics are situated in the central part of Cau-
casus, which is strategically the most important
one. This would also frustrate the Kremlin’s poli-
cy in South Ossetia, which following the war in
the early 90’s has separated from Georgia and is
today a quasi-independent state, unofficially
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supported by Moscow (Tbilisi strives for taking
over control of South Ossetia, while Russia aims
at freezing the conflict, which enables it to exert
pressure on Georgia; South Ossetia would like to
join the Russian Federation).
2.5. Conflicts in the western part 
of North Caucasus
The danger of turning of the conflicts in the wes-
tern part of North Caucasus into military clashes
has many a time seemed imminent. These inclu-
de, above all, the conflicts in Kabardino-Balkaria
and Karachay-Cherkessia (between the Turkic-
-speaking Balkars and Karachays and Kabardins
and Circassians, whose languages belong to the
Caucasian branch)31. Both republics were artifi-
cially created in the 1930’s. When, following the
collapse of the USSR, the Balkar, Karachay and
Circassian national movements emerged (Circas-
sians, Kabardins and Adygeyans basically form
one nation) it seemed that they would naturally
break up. Since the early 90’s, the nationalist op-
position has inter alia made demands for either
separation of Balkaria and creation of a separate
republic or its unification with the Karachay, as
well as for uniting all the lands inhabited by the
Circassian people (Kabarda, Cherkessia and Ady-
geya), creation of one republic and gradual sepa-
ration from the Russian Federation. The slogans
of return of the so-called muhajir from Turkey
and Middle East countries to their ancestors’ land
were also popular in the Circassian national mo-
vement32. However, like it was in the case of Da-
gestan, the Kremlin actively supported the local
communist elites, who have kept the power in
Nalchik and Cherkessk and prevented any such
divides33.
Even though the conflicts between Kabardins
and Balkars and between Karachays and Circas-
sians have never turned into a military confronta-
tion, the tension is all the time there and it sub-
stantially grows before every elections. The most
serious crisis emerged during the 1999 presiden-
tial election in Karachay-Cherkessia; mass demon-
strations and riots sparked then in Cherkessk
between supporters of the Karachay Vladimir
Semionov and the Circassian Stanislav Derev34.
3. The religious conflicts
3.1. The major religions of the region
In terms of religion, North Caucasus can be divi-
ded into two parts: the Russian Orthodox north
and the Muslim south. Most of the residents of
Stavropol and Krasnodar Krais and 2/3 of the resi-
dents of North Ossetia are members of the Rus-
sian Orthodox Church. A great majority of the
population of the autonomous republics practice
Islam in the Sunni version (only Azeris living in
Dagestan are Shiites)35. There also live represen-
tatives of other religions, including Buddhists
(most of the Kalmyks), Jews, Catholics, Protes-
tants and Russian Old Believers, in the region. 
3.2. The divides and conflicts 
inside Islam 
The North Caucasian Islam is not uniform; it is
inside it that the most numerous religious con-
flicts occur. The conflicts, which had been growing
as Islam had been reviving since the collapse of
the USSR, became subdued after the outbreak of
the second Chechen war. However, currently, they
are getting sharper again. 
The bitterest conflict is the one between the sup-
porters of the so-called traditional Islam and the
reformers; it mostly concerns the Dagestani and
Chechen Islam. In Caucasus, the following groups
are referred to as traditionalist: 
– representatives of the so-called official Islam:
these include the muftiats of particular republics,
which are called the Spiritual Administrations
(e.g. the SA of Muslims in Dagestan), each of
which forms a separate organisation; all the
“legal” Muslim clergymen report to them; 
– sheikhs and members of Sufi brotherhoods
(tariqas): many Muslims of Dagestan, Chechnya
and Ingushetia belong to them; in Dagestan, the
most popular is the Naqshbandiya brotherhood,
and in Chechnya, the Kadiriya; the sheikhs and
their murids form very strong and well-organ-
ised groups; they have an immense influence on
the political life of Chechnya and Dagestan36.
Representatives of the official Islam and mem-
bers of the Sufi brotherhoods claim that the
North Caucasian Islam differs from the rest of
the Islamic world; it has its own traditions, cer-
emonies and forms of cult. Both of them do not
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see any need for religious reform (they treat the
reform advocates as extremists) and they strive
for isolation from the external world. Both of
them are loyal to the authorities and they closely
cooperate with them, which ensures them favour
and support from the authorities in fighting their
opponents (except for Chechnya, where many
members of the brotherhoods fight on the side
of the militants)37. 
The reformers, who are usually referred to as
Wahhabis or Salafis (Arabian salaf means ances-
tor or going back to the roots), can in turn be di-
vided into:
– moderate: a small group made up of represen-
tatives of the intelligentsia and clergy; they op-
pose the official Islam and Sufism, claiming these
forms are fossilized, outdated and discredited due
to their cooperation with the authorities; in their
opinion, Islam in Caucasus should be reformed
and cleaned off the non-Islamic loans, which oc-
curred in the Soviet times; they are advocates of
the idea of Muslim solidarity (both in Caucasus
and all over the world); they believe that the
changes should be made in a peaceful way; they
are not well-organised, they do not found any or-
ganisations or political parties;
– radicals: a conglomerate of small groups of
people organised in the so-called Jamaats; simi-
larly to the moderates, they opt for reform of the
North Caucasian Islam, yet they believe that this
should be done through abolishment of the cur-
rent authorities (both secular and religious); so-
me of them are advocates of creation of an inde-
pendent Islamic state in Caucasus; the radical
Wahhabis are stronger and more numerous than
the moderate ones; they are mainly active in
Chechnya and Dagestan, yet also in Ingushetia,
Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria38.
The conflict between the Wahhabis and the tra-
ditionalists has existed since the appearance of
the former ones in Caucasus39. It reached its peak
in 1996–1999. At that time, the centre of the radi-
cal Islam was the uncontrolled by the Kremlin
Chechnya, which, in early 1999, was proclaimed
an Islamic state, and the Shariah law was intro-
duced in its territory40. Many Chechen comman-
ders then accepted the Wahhabi ideology as their
own and supported its followers outside of Che-
chnya41. Wahhabis were also very active in Dage-
stan. The best-known “Islamic experiment” in
the republic was the proclamation in spring 1998
of several villages of Buinaksk district (the so-
called Kadar zone) a free Islamic territory (where
the Shariah law applied) and driving representa-
tives of the authorities out of there. As the second
Chechen war began, the Kadar zone was liqui-
dated by the federal troops (September 1999).
Since 1999, Islamists in North Caucasus (both acti-
vists and people who sympathise with them) and
any opponents of the official Islam have been
persecuted. This has taken a particularly brutal
form in Dagestan, where under the pressure of
the Muslim clergy a law that bans propagation
of Wahhabism has been adopted. In spite of the
persecutions, the number of supporters of radi-
cal Islam in Caucasus is constantly growing: most
of the Chechen militants today are followers of
the Islamic ideology; strong Wahhabi groups exist
in Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ka-
rachay-Cherkessia and in Stavropol Krai. The con-
flict of Wahhabis with the traditionalists and the
authorities is intensifying and it soon may be-
come much more serious than the ethnic conflicts.
The stimulating factors include the Chechen war
spilling over the neighbouring republics, the per-
secution of the Caucasian population by the Rus-
sian law enforcement agencies and the terrible
socioeconomic situation in the region. The autho-
rities reject any possibility of dialogue with the
Islamists; therefore this movement is getting in-
creasingly more radical and it not infrequently
chooses terrorism as a fight method42. 
It is very difficult to assess the scale of external
influence on the development of the Wahhabi
movement in North Caucasus. The Kremlin exag-
gerates this, trying to prove that radical Islam
and terrorism linked to it are an effect of the in-
fluence of the international terrorism. However,
the reality is slightly different. Although contacts
of the North Caucasian radicals with Islamists all
over the world, including with terrorist organi-
sations, really exist, still they should not be
overestimated. Both terrorism and development
of radical Islam in Caucasus are a direct result of
the regional problems, and the existence of an
external factor is of secondary meaning in this
context.
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3.3. The Orthodox Church vs. Islam
Disputes between Islam and the Orthodox Church
are rare in the region. Nevertheless, the growing
tension and escalation of violence there bring
about first signs of such a conflict. This, in par-
ticular, concerns the regions inhabited mostly by
Russians, to which increasingly more Muslims
are migrating. Conflicts between the indigenous
population and immigrants (usually economically
motivated) very often take the form of religious
conflicts. They are also presented in this context
by some Russian nationalist politicians and some
hierarchs and clergymen of the Russian Orthodox
Church. There also are increasingly more con-
flicts between members of the Orthodox Church
and Muslims over the construction of temples
and other places of religious cult.
4. The problems of the 
“Russian-speaking” Caucasus
One of the greatest problems of the Russian-
speaking Caucasus (Stavropol and Krasnodar
Krais) is the issue of migrations (both internal and
external) and the ethnic and religious conflicts
linked thereto, as well as the problem of growing
xenophobia and radicalisation of the public sen-
timents. 
4.1. The migrations
Since the break-up of the USSR, the North Cau-
casian region, which used to be located inside
the country, has become the southernmost part
of the Russian Federation, a region directly bor-
dering on the turbulent South Caucasus and Cen-
tral Asia. The military conflicts in the countries
of those regions, the economic crisis that emer-
ged there as a result of the breakdown of the So-
viet economy and the intensifying anti-Russian
sentiments caused that Stavropol and Krasnodar
Krais have since the early 90’s become targets of
mass immigration43. The immigrants who go
there can be divided into the following groups: 
– ethnic Russians: they are leaving both the sta-
tes of South Caucasus and Central Asia and the
autonomous republics of North Caucasus (nearly
300 thousand Russians, most of whom settled in
both krais, have left Chechnya alone); 
– Armenians, Azeris, Georgians, Abkhazians
and other indigenous residents of South Cauca-
sus: initially, they were mostly refugees from the
areas troubled by military conflicts in Nagorno-
Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thereafter
economic emigrants joined them;
– Chechens, Dagestanis and other North Cauca-
sian autochthones, who leave their republics due
to the war or economic difficulties (vast unem-
ployment, hunger for land, overpopulation);
– Tajiks, Kazakhs, Uzbeks and other represen-
tatives of the indigenous population of Central
Asia: initially, they were refugees from civil-war-
-torn Tajikistan and groups prosecuted due to
their ethnic background (e.g. Meskhetin Turks);
thereafter economic emigrants joined them.
The influx of non-Russians is accompanied by the
constantly lessening number of the native Rus-
sian population due to low population growth
rates (small number of births and high mortality
rate) and emigration of Russians to other regions
of the Federation (mainly to Moscow) and abroad
(United States, Western Europe, Israel). In con-
trast, among the immigrants (mainly Muslim),
the population growth rate is very high, which
makes them even more numerous in southern
Russia44.
4.2. The conflicts of Russians 
with immigrants
Initially, conflicts between Russians and immi-
grants resulted mainly from contradictory eco-
nomic interests. The newcomers, who were more
mobile, hard-working, willing to take the hardest
jobs and engage in the most risky enterprises
and, additionally, supported by the well-develo-
ped clan structures, were perceived by Russians
as strong competitors, who were taking away
their jobs and dishonesty getting rich at their
expense. Problems with contacts between the two
groups stemmed from the differences between
their cultures and mentalities as well as from the
common stereotypes and superstitions. The pre-
judices and misunderstandings started gradually
turning into enmity manifesting itself in increas-
ingly more frequent violent conflicts and grad-
ual mutual isolation of both communities. The
factor that has stimulated the ethnic conflicts,
which are now turning even into racial conflicts
(hatred to all the “black”, as Russians call resi-
dents of Caucasus and Central Asia), is the war
in Chechnya and the terrorist attacks in Russia,
which are linked to the war. 
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The local authorities not only do nothing to
counteract the mounting wave of xenophobic
sentiments among Russians (which are referred
to by analysts and journalists as Caucasophobia
or Islamophobia), but also even instigate such
attitudes. This is the case for instance in Krasno-
dar Krai, the governor of which, Aleksandr Tka-
chov, known for his nationalist views, has for
many years lobbied in Moscow for sharpening of
the immigration law, including for making easier
deportation of illegal immigrants and introducing
settlement quotas for particular ethnic groups45.
Repressions, harassment, deprivation of rights
and other forms of persecution used by the autho-
rities (above all, militia and administration clerks)
against immigrants from Caucasus and Central
Asia are considered normal there46. Pogroms of
non-Russian population are sporadically organised
by neo-fascist or Cossack gangs, while the autho-
rities remain totally passive47.
5. The socioeconomic problems
5.1 The socioeconomic situation
North Caucasus is one of the poorest regions of
the Russian Federation. Already in the Soviet ti-
mes, it was backward as compared to other parts
of the empire; there was hidden unemployment
there (e.g. in Chechnya and Dagestan) and many
people were forced to emigrate in search for jobs.
The break-up of the USSR, the collapse of the
centrally planned economy, the outbreak of mili-
tary conflicts, closure of many borders: all this
has only aggravated the existing problems.
The situation is the worst in Chechnya, whose
economy is in ruin despite the existence of high-
quality oil deposits in the republic; most of the
towns and villages destroyed during the two
wars (including Grozny) have not been rebuilt,
land cultivation or cattle breeding is impossible
in many parts of the republic due to the mine-
fields. The unemployment level is as high as 80%,
and people only survive owing to barter economy
and trade in illegally produced oil. Although the
Russian budget allocates enormous funds for eco-
nomic reconstruction of Chechnya (since 2000,
62 billion roubles, i.e. over US$ 2 billion), most of
them remain in the hands of officials in Moscow
and Grozny and some are taken over by the mili-
tants48.
The economic situation in such republics as Dage-
stan, Ingushetia or North Ossetia is not much
better: basically, no enterprises are operating
there, most of the population live in unimagin-
able poverty, surviving only thanks to cultiva-
tion of small bits of land around their houses,
relatively regularly paid old-age pensions, small
trade and work of young men outside Caucasus.
The only ones to be well-off are the people having
connections with the authorities (approximately
2% of the population), whose sources of income
include: subsidies from the federal budget, trade
in profitable goods (mainly oil and caviar), forc-
ing out protection money from the population
(e.g. for accepting a child to a school, at militia
stations, for “safe” business running, etc.)49.
The economic situation is even aggravated by
the high population growth, which e.g. in Ingu-
shetia is approximately 11 per mils annually, and
in Dagestan the rate is approximately 950. The
hunger for land and the lack of jobs in the moun-
tains forces a multitude of people (above all, the
young) to emigrate to the cities, where they do
not have any bright prospects, either; as a result,
in such cities as Makhachkala (its population has
grown from 300 thousand in 1989 to 550 thou-
sand in 2004) or Vladikavkaz, there are districts
where people live in extreme poverty, there are
increasingly more unemployed and desperate
people, ready for anything51. 
The constantly worsening economic conditions
and the lack of any prospect for improvement of
the situation have very far-reaching social effects.
The lack of jobs causes many people choose cri-
me as their way of living and the common avai-
lability of guns makes North Caucasus the most
criminalised region of the Russian Federation52.
One of the most profitable sources of income is
kidnapping people for ransom, which is not only
done by armed gangs in Chechnya and Dagestan,
but also by federal soldiers and pro-Russian
Chechen groups (above all, the troops reporting
to deputy prime minister of Chechnya, Ramzan
Kadyrov). The economic crisis is also the cause of
the progressing disintegration of family and clan
ties (mass emigrations of men in search for jobs
lead to break-up of many families) and decay of
the traditional moral values (earlier, e.g. there
was no prostitution, begging or homelessness in
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Caucasus; now, this occurs increasingly more
often). Additionally, more and more people are
engaged in drug production and smuggling53.
5.2. The danger of social revolt
The current socioeconomic crisis in Caucasus is
so serious that an outbreak of mass social unrest
or even social revolt cannot be excluded. In par-
ticular, this concerns the eastern part of the re-
gion, where the situation is the hardest, the popu-
lation growth is the highest and the population
is the youngest. In case of a sudden destabilisa-
tion of the political situation, which is possible
any time there, the accumulated social frustra-
tion may lead to an uncontrolled explosion. This
is even more probable because the conflict be-
tween the great majority of people living in
extreme poverty and the commonly hated elite,
which is constantly getting richer, is getting bit-
terer in those communities. The fact that people
show deep dislike to the authorities can be pro-
ven for instance by the silent support they give
to the radical Islamist groups which organise
attacks on representatives of the Dagestani law
enforcement agencies (since the beginning of this
year, tens of them have been killed). Regardless
of their enormous efforts, the authorities have
not managed to catch even one perpetrator of
such crimes. For some time now, increasingly
more Dagestanis, Ingushes and representatives
of other ethnic groups join Chechen guerrilla
forces or form their own military units. Many
facts also indicate that residents of the republics
neighbouring on Chechnya sympathise with or
actively help the militants moving towards the
republic. Unless the situation in the region starts
improving, it cannot be excluded that, if e.g. rad-
ical Islamists make an attempt to abolish the au-
thorities in one of the republics, a great part of
the population can take their side. 
II. The Kremlin’s Policy 
in North Caucasus
Regardless of the existence of so many problems
and conflicts in the region, the Kremlin has
failed to work out any coherent and long-term
concept for the development of North Caucasus
or a programme for integration of the region with
the rest of the Russian Federation that would take
into consideration its ethnic, religious and social
peculiarities. The authorities often take emer-
gency actions in response to crises instead of
preventing them; decisions taken by various
authorities responsible for the Kremlin’s policy
in Caucasus are often mutually contradictory and
their actions are uncoordinated (e.g. in Chechnya,
particular law enforcement agencies are rival-
ling one another, which affects the security level
in the republic). This policy consists in abortive
attempts to liquidate the consequences of nega-
tive tendencies and phenomena and not in fight-
ing the causes thereof. Sticking to some dogmas
in the Caucasian policy (e.g. the belief that force-
ful solutions are successful), the authorities are
all the time making the same mistakes, unwill-
ing to recognise their obvious failures. A perfect
example is Vladimir Putin’s policy in Chechnya:
although the assassination of president Kadyrov
clearly showed that a politician with no public
support, elected as a result of fixed elections
that provide no other alternative, is not able to
keep the power for a long time, again, this
August, the Kremlin conducted another identical
election in Chechnya (Alu Alkhanov was “elect-
ed” president)54. 
1. Caucasus as an internal affair 
of Russia
One of the priorities of the Kremlin’s policy in
Caucasus is preventing other countries from
interfering in the region’s affairs. Even though
no state or international organisation challenges
the fact that Caucasus is an internal affair of
Russia, still Moscow treats any, even the softest,
criticism of its policy in the region (in particular,
violations of human rights by Russian soldiers in
Chechnya, appeals for Moscow to embark upon
peace negotiations with the Chechens or attempts
to discuss the issue of Chechnya at the interna-
tional forum) as violation of this principle55.
Although internationalisation of the Chechen pro-
blem to some degree, engagement of interna-
tional organisations in resolution of the conflict
and enabling them to act in the republic could
have contributed to ending the war, Moscow
strongly opposes any external interference. 
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2. The “antiterrorist operation”
An important element of the Russian policy in
North Caucasus is the “antiterrorist operation”56.
From autumn 1999, it was led by the federal
army, from June 2000 to June 2003, it was con-
ducted by the Federal Security Service, and cur-
rently it is controlled by the Ministry of Internal
Affairs. The official purpose of launching the
operation was to detain or liquidate the terrorist
leaders responsible for the raid on Dagestan and
bombings in Russian cities, who were hiding in
Chechnya, while the real target was to pacify the
separatist Chechnya and liquidate its authorities
and military units reporting to them. 
It was only possible to launch the antiterrorist
operation in Caucasus owing to the victory of
supporters of the forceful solution to the Che-
chen issue at the Kremlin. It is based on the con-
viction, which has lingered on in Russia at least
since the 19th century, that force is the only suc-
cessful method in Caucasus, and that Caucasian
nations and politicians cannot be trusted and
that they cannot be treated as equal partners in
dialogue but only as inferiors. This view is, above
all, represented by the law enforcement agencies
(the federal army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Federal Security Service), a significant part of
Russian politicians (including president Vladimir
Putin) and by the public opinion. Subsequent
Russian failures in Caucasus are usually blamed
on too lenient methods, poor performance of spe-
cial forces or lack of coordination between par-
ticular law enforcement forces, and never on dis-
proportionate usage of force. Those few politi-
cians, journalists and human rights activists
who appeal for revising the policy of force in Cau-
casus and launching negotiations with the Che-
chen separatists (e.g. Anna Politkovskaya, Sergey
Kovalov, Andrei Babitsky) are seen by the authori-
ties as traitors and representatives of the inte-
rests of the West or even supporters of the “ter-
rorists”. 
The operation objective set in 1999 (both the offi-
cial and unofficial one) has never been achieved:
those guilty of the raid on Dagestan and bomb-
ings in Russian cities have not been caught, it
has proved impossible to finally defeat the mili-
tants, who still are a serious military force and
are supported by a significant part of the resi-
dents of Chechnya. Instead, the consequences of
the actions taken as a part of the operation have
been born, first of all, by the Chechen civilian
population and at times also by residents of the
republics neighbouring on Chechnya. The opera-
tion has had the opposite effect to the intended
one: the Chechen conflict has not ended or even
localised, instead, it is gradually spilling over
the entire North Caucasian region; terrorism has
not been liquidated, instead, its real birth has
been provoked57.
3. The role of the law enforcement
agencies
North Caucasus is often referred to as a “republic
of the military”. This is due to the fact that it is
the most militarised region of the Russian Fede-
ration, where the law enforcement agencies have
the greatest influence and the strongest stand-
ing58. Of the three key Russian law enforcement
agencies (Ministry of Defence, Federal Security
Service and Ministry of Internal Affairs), the Ar-
med Forces of the Russian Federation (usually re-
ferred to as the federal army, reporting to the
Russian Ministry of Defence), which de facto con-
trol the “antiterrorist operation”, are taking the
lead. The standing and influence of the army,
which had been weakened by its defeat in the
first Chechen war and humiliated by the need to
withdraw from Chechnya (1996), have excessively
strengthened since the beginning of the “anti-
terrorist operation”. 
The law enforcement agencies are interested in
keeping the situation instable in North Caucasus,
owing to which their influence in the country is
strengthening. This also causes constant growth
of the budget spending on military purposes
(e.g. the outlays on the military in 2005 are sup-
posed to be higher by 35% as compared to 200459)
and provides additional chance of being promot-
ed and making a career outside of the army60.
The war has also provided the military with the
opportunity to do numerous illegal businesses,
such as: trade in oil produced in Chechnya61, rob-
bing the civilian population, forcing out protec-
tion money (mainly at checkpoints and on roads)
and trade in people. 
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Law enforcement agencies form a pillar of the
Caucasian policy of president Putin, who has
been consistently applying the forceful solution
there. This, however, also affects the head of the
Russian state, who by relying on the army and
special forces in his Caucasian policy is becom-
ing their hostage. It was the war in Chechnya
that enabled Putin rise to power and today he
must pay due respect to the interests of the mil-
itary, even though protracting the conflict in
Chechnya, and even less so its spilling over the
neighbouring republics, is not in the Kremlin’s
interest. 
4. Supporting the puppet regimes
The political system in the republics of North
Caucasus reminds of a classical colonial system
(the system is also similar in other Russian
regions; however, in Caucasus this is particular-
ly noticeable). The power is there in the hands of
corrupt local clans (always made up of represen-
tatives of the autochthon population) having con-
nections with the criminal world, whom Mos-
cow, in exchange for their loyalty, allows for 
a certain degree of economic independence and
conducting their independent internal policy
(fighting the opposition, nominating their people
to important posts, etc.). The Kremlin gives the
local regimes, hated by most of the local popula-
tion, the ability to dispose of the funds received
by them from the federal budget, which they
spend almost exclusively on their private needs,
in an uncontrolled way (to a certain extent). This
is the price Moscow is ready to pay for keeping
the republics in relative peace, unarguably fulfill-
ing its directives concerning regional and foreign
policy and ensuring proper outcome and turnout
in presidential and parliamentary elections62.
The classical examples of such puppet regimes,
separated from their own communities and sup-
ported by the Kremlin, are the rules of the clans
of Kadyrov in Chechnya, Magomedali Magome-
dov in Dagestan or Valery Kokov in Kabardino-
-Balkaria.
5. The marginalisation 
of the opposition
Relying on puppet regimes, Moscow at the same
time rejects any possibility of dialogue with the
opposition forces in particular republics, which
often enjoy much greater support and respect of
the public than the authorities. Since the begin-
ning of the current war in Chechnya, Moscow
has consistently refused embarking on negotia-
tions with the leaders of the militants, including
with the legally elected (January 1997) president
Aslan Maskhadov, who has many a time appealed
for dialogue, giving to understand that the Che-
chen leaders are ready to make far-reaching con-
cessions on many issues (including on the issue
of independence of Chechnya)63. Although
Maskhadov and his envoys abroad (among others
Akhmad Zakayev, Umar Khambiyev) have many
a time condemned terrorism as a method of strug-
gle and the Kremlin has never presented any proof
for their participation in staging any attacks, the
Russian authorities label the Chechen leaders ter-
rorists, with whom only unconditional capitula-
tion can be discussed. 
The situation is similar in Ingushetia. In December
2001, president of the republic, Ruslan Aushev,
who was deeply respected among the Ingush pu-
blic, was removed from his post and replaced by
Murat Ziazikov, the unpopular and deprived of
any charisma general of Federal Security Servi-
ce64. His policy (or rather implementation of dire-
ctives given by the Kremlin or particular law en-
forcement agencies) has led to destabilisation of
the internal situation in the republic, which is on
the brink of civil war now (even the mufti of
Ingushetia, Magomed Albogachiyev has rebelled
against Ziazikov). The opposition forces in other
republics of the region are deprived of any influ-
ence, as well. 
The authorities also reject any dialogue with the
increasingly stronger Islamists (Dagestan, Ka-
bardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia), who, un-
der the pretext of combating terrorism and Wah-
habism, are fought against by the local authorities
and representatives of the official Islam. Pushing
opposition forces on the margins of political life
leads to their radicalisation (in terms of both ide-
ology and political struggle methods), taking the
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anti-Russian position, search for contacts with
Chechen separatists and often joining the mili-
tant troops. 
6. The propaganda
Another important element of the Kremlin’s poli-
cy in Caucasus is the propaganda in the mass
media, which is targeted at both the domestic
audience and the international opinion. Through
adequate selection of information on the region
and intentional disinformation, which is possible
owing to their control over the key mass media
(above all, television) the Russian authorities are
trying to convince Russians and the West that
the situation in the region is stable and peaceful,
and that any problems are resolved owing to the
perfect cooperation of the federal centre with
the local authorities65. The Kremlin’s propaganda
in the mass media is particularly aggressive when
it comes to the situation in Chechnya: the infor-
mation is often untrue and reports e.g. on elec-
tions in the republic look as if they were made in
the worst communist times. The Kremlin is able
to provide information that could not be further
from the truth and to present Chechnya as a kind
of a “Potiomkin-style village” due to the limita-
tion of freedom of the mass media under presi-
dent Putin’s rules and holding an almost total
monopoly on information from Chechnya66. The
propaganda really works in the Russian society,
a proof to that being the results of public opin-
ion polls carried out after the tragic events in
Russia linked to the situation in Caucasus, e.g.
after the Dubrovka theatre or Beslan attacks. The
proper way of reporting and commenting such
events causes that they do not affect the popu-
larity of president Putin, who is to a great extent
responsible for them67.
III. North Caucasus 
and the future of Russia
1. The effect of the situation 
in Caucasus on Russia
The instable situation in North Caucasus pro-
foundly affects many spheres of Russian politi-
cal, social and economic life. It leaves its mark
on the internal situation, foreign policy, power
system, elites, state institutions and structures,
on the society, economy, mass media, etc. It is 
a serious threat to the national security, an impedi-
ment to implementing reforms, a source of dege-
neration of the state administration and demo-
ralisation of the Russian army. The situation in
Caucasus is also a key reason for the develop-
ment of terrorism in Russia, it is one of the stimu-
lants to increasing the influence of the law enfor-
cement agencies in the state, it causes strengthen-
ing of authoritarianism and limitation of the
freedom of speech under the rule of president
Putin as well as intensification of Caucasophobia
and Islamophobia among the Russian society and
development of nationalist sentiments68.
2. The future of Caucasus
The future of North Caucasus to a great extent
depends on whether the problems and conflicts
existing in the region are resolved or aggravate.
If they intensify and deepen, in the nearest years,
Caucasus will be plunging into chaos and insta-
bility; further escalation of violence and subse-
quent terrorist attacks should also be expected.
Such a scenario will also mean continuation of
the dangerous for Russia tendencies and proces-
ses: the gradual drifting away of Caucasus from
Russia, its derussification and Islamisation. An
extreme example of this is Chechnya: the Rus-
sian law practically does not apply there (inter-
personal relations are based on either the law of
the stronger, Shariah or adat, the unwritten Che-
chen law), Chechens do not serve in the Russian
army, almost all the Russians who had lived in
Chechnya before 1989 have left the republic, and
the young generation does not feel in any way
tied with the Russian state, culture or society69. 
Other Muslim Caucasian republics are also beco-
ming less and less Russian (although this pro-
cess is much slower there than in Chechnya),
drifting towards Islam, which is slowly becom-
ing one of the most important components of
the North Caucasian identity70. Their residents
less and less identify themselves with the Rus-
sian state, feeling they do not belong to it, and
even though they leave for Moscow and other
Russian regions in search for jobs, they feel stran-
gers there71. This is to a great extent a result of
the widespread xenophobia in Russia towards all
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“people of Caucasian nationality” as people com-
ing from Caucasus are there commonly referred
to (this term is perceived by them as extremely
offensive). Already today, North Caucasus is a kind
of an enclave, a foreign body within the borders
of the Russian Federation, which is also confir-
med by Russians visiting this region (journalists,
soldiers on military service there and people who
have accidentally found themselves in any of the
Caucasian republics). This explains to a certain
degree the reactions of the Russian society to the
events happening in Caucasus: information on
Caucasus in the mass media is perceived by a
majority of Russians as reports from abroad and
not as from a part of their country. So long as the
tragedies happening there (except for such terri-
ble ones as e.g. the attack in Beslan) do not cross
the borders of Caucasus and do not affect Russia
proper, the public opinion is indifferent. This is
due to the fact that Caucasus is departing from
Russia not only in reality but also in the minds of
Russians themselves. 
The tendencies described above could be slowed
down by a change in the Kremlin’s policy towards
the region: making a real attempt to end the Che-
chen war, curtailing the powers of the law en-
forcement agencies in the region, dialogue with
the opposition in particular republics, giving up
forceful methods and letting the international
community become involved in cooperation in
the region. It would also be necessary to work
out a coherent long-term concept for socioeco-
nomic development of the region and its inte-
gration with the Russian Federation. This would
certainly need huge financial outlays, enormous
effort by authorities on all the levels and the will
to overcome the objection of those who benefit
from instability in the region. However, such a
change is impossible in Russia today for many
reasons. 
Firstly, the Kremlin lacks the will to revise its
policy towards Caucasus: president Putin and his
closest milieu, most of whom originate from the
Soviet special services, see any will to compro-
mise and admitting their own mistakes as show-
ing their weakness, and the only remedies for
their failures in Caucasus they can resort to in-
clude increasing the powers of the law enforce-
ment agencies and strengthening their control
over the society and sharpening the regime in
Chechnya and other republics. Any decided mo-
ves in Caucasus meant to change the policy in
the region must have been accompanied by ex-
tensive political, social and economic reforms in
the country, which president Putin has failed to
choose72. Secondly, even if the Kremlin made an
attempt to change its policy in Caucasus, this
could be blocked by such factors as: 
– the lack of sufficient funds, 
– the lack of proper staff, 
– the resistance of the law enforcement agencies, 
– degeneration of state officers (soldiers, clerks,
etc.). 
Russia’s cooperation with international organi-
sations and its opening to foreign aid would have
made it easier for Moscow to overcome such dif-
ficulties, yet president Putin’s team is unwilling
to such cooperation. Thus, with the current ad-
ministration, which is striving for imposing on
the country as authoritarian rules as possible,
and given the present condition of the Russian
state, any change of the Caucasian policy is im-
possible. This means that the chaos in Caucasus,
which is departing increasingly further away
from Moscow, and the processes described here-
in above will be deepening. In the longer term,
this may end in a far-going autonomy or even
separation of the region from the Russian Fede-
ration73.
2. The impact of North Caucasus 
on the future of Russia
Even though as recently as in the first half of the
90’s North Caucasus seemed to be an unimpor-
tant periphery of the empire, and the problems
and conflicts there seemed insignificant for the
Russian state, the first Chechen war has proven
that the situation in the region is of enormous
importance for Russia. North Caucasus is the re-
gion where many extremely serious problems
are concentrated, and the resolution to them will
decide on the future of Russia74. Such issues as:
the Chechen war, other ethnic and religious con-
flicts, rapid growth of non-Russian and Muslim
population, decreasing number of ethnic Russians,
etc. pose questions of existential nature to the
Russian state. How to integrate the non-Russian
population with the rest of the country’s resi-
dents, on what basis should the state be built
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and which idea should unite the increasingly mo-
re diverse society (whether the state should be
national or multiethnic, federalised or centra-
lised, secular or based on the Orthodox Church)?
How to prevent ethnic and religious conflicts
which may blow up the Russian Federation from
within? Therefore, such fundamental issues as
endurance of the Russian Federation, its future
shape and political, administrational and social
system, stability and security of the state will
depend on whether and how Russia copes with
the problems of Caucasus.
So long as Moscow is unable to resolve the prob-
lems of North Caucasus, above all, to end the war
in Chechnya as soon as possible, it will remain 
a greatly unpredictable and instable country in
danger of terrorism and shaken by increasingly
deeper internal conflicts, a country from which
thousands emigrate because they are persecuted
for their nationality or religion75. Unless the
Kremlin copes with Caucasus, it will not be pos-
sible for Russia to take the path of democratic re-
form and to make the attempt to create a modern
country, open to cooperation with the world.
The alternative is an authoritarian state, limiting
civil liberties and exerting increasingly greater
control over the society, an economically back-
ward country, isolating itself from the rest of the
world. Already today, Caucasus is the cause of
gradual disintegration of the Russian state, its
structures and society76; unless this is slowed
down by changing the policy towards the region,
it may become the cause of its collapse. 
Caucasus is strategically very important for Mos-
cow, as it is the southernmost part, the “soft un-
derbelly of Russia”, a region which separates Rus-
sia proper from South Caucasus and the Middle
East and Central Asia, where very disturbing
processes are taking place (e.g. the development
of Islamic fundamentalism). A stable and inte-
grated with the rest of the Federation North
Caucasus can be a dam protecting Russia against
ingress of such processes, while an instable one
will be an entry gate for Islamic radicals, inter-
national terrorists, organised crime, etc. Further
development of the situation in North Caucasus
will also decide on Russia’s standing in the post-
Soviet area, above all, in South Caucasus. North
Caucasian republics are a kind of back-up facili-
ties for the Russian policy towards Georgia, Ar-
menia and Azerbaijan; therefore, to maintain its
influence there, Moscow must ensure stability
and security in North Caucasus. 
Maciej Falkowski
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Annex 
Brief characteristics of particu-
lar parts of North Caucasus
Dagestan 
area: 50.3 thousand km2; 
location: eastern part of North Caucasus by the
Caspian Sea: borders on Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Chechnya, Stavropol Krai and Kalmykia; 
capital: Makhachkala (pop. approx. 550 thousand); 
other large cities: Derbent (95 thousand), Kha-
savyurt (88 thousand) and Kaspiysk (71 thou-
sand); 
population: 2.58 million; 
ethnic make-up: Avars (27.5%), Dargins (15.5%),
Kumyks (12.8%), Lezgins (11.3%), Russians
(approx. 6%), Laks (5.1%), Tabassarans (4.3%),
Azeris (4.1%), Chechens-Akins (3.2%), Nogays
(1.5%), Rutuls (0.8%), Aghuls (0.7%), Tats (0.7%),
Tsakhurs (0.2%) and other; 
religion: more than 90% of the residents are
Sunni Muslims, other religious groups: Shiite
Muslims, Orthodox Christians and Jews; 
chairman of the State Council: Magomedali Ma-
gomedov (since 1990)77
Chechnya
area: approx. 16.5 thousand km2 (since the divi-
sion of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR in 1992, the
border between Chechnya and Ingushetia has
not been formally fixed); 
location: central-eastern part of North Caucasus;
borders on Georgia, Ingushetia, North Ossetia,
Stavropol Krai and Dagestan; 
capital: Grozny (from 40 to 120 thousand residents);
other large cities: Urus-Martan (approx. 40 thou-
sand), Gudermes (approx. 30 thousand), Shali
(approx. 24 thousand), Argun (approx. 23 thou-
sand); 
population: approx. 600 thousand (officially 1.1
million, however, the number is, in all probabil-
ity, overstated); 
ethnic make-up: Chechens (more than 90%;
until 1989, they accounted for 57.8% of the pop-
ulation), Russians (no data available, a little more
than ten thousand people; until 1989, 23.1%); 
religion: Sunni Muslims (over 90%), a small
number of Orthodox Christians; 
president Alu Alkhanov (since 2004)
Ingushetia 
area: approx. 4.3 thousand km2 (the smallest
entity of the Russian Federation); 
location: central-eastern part of North Caucasus;
borders on Georgia, Chechnya, North Ossetia and
Stavropol Krai; 
capital: Magas (no permanent residents, only
administration centre); 
other large cities: Nazran (120 thousand; until
1998, the capital city), Malgobek (50 thousand),
Karabulak (29 thousand); 
population: 468 thousand; 
ethnic make-up: Ingushes (approx. 80%), Che-
chens (approx. 20%; most of them are Chechen
refugees); 
religion: Sunni Muslims (almost 100%); 
president Murat Ziazikov (since 2002)
North Ossetia 
area: 8 thousand km2; 
location: central part of North Caucasus; borders
on Georgia (including the separatist South
Ossetia), Ingushetia, Chechnya, Stavropol Krai
and Kabardino-Balkaria; 
capital: Vladikavkaz (313 thousand); 
other large cities: Mozdok (40 thousand) and
Beslan (35 thousand); 
population: 709 thousand; 
ethnic make-up: Ossetians (59%), Russians (24%),
Ingushes (5.4%), Armenians (2.2%) and others; 
religion: Orthodox Christians (approx. 70%),
Sunni Muslims (approx. 30%); 
president Aleksandr Dzasokhov (since 1998)
Kabardino-Balkaria 
area: 12.5 thousand km2; 
location: central-western part of North Cauca-
sus; borders on Georgia, North Ossetia, Stavropol
Krai and Karachay-Cherkessia; 
capital: Nalchik (234 thousand); 
other large cities: Prokhladnyi (60 thousand)
and Baksan (32 thousand); 
population: 900 thousand; 
ethnic make-up: Kabardins (48%), Russians (32%),
Balkars (9%) and others; 
religion: Sunni Muslims (Kabardins and Balkars)
and Orthodox Christians (Russians); 
president Valery Kokov (since 1991)
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Karachay-Cherkessia 
area: 14.1 thousand km2; 
location: western part of North Caucasus; bor-
ders on Georgia (including the separatist Abkha-
zia), Krasnodar Krai, Stavropol Krai and Kabardi-
no-Balkaria; 
capital: Cherkessk (122 thousand); 
other large cities: Ust-Jeguta (31 thousand) and
Karachayevsk (15 thousand); 
population: 439 thousand; 
ethnic make-up: Russians (40%), Karachays
(33.4%), Circassians (11%), the Abaza (4.6%), No-
gays (3.1%); 
religion: mainly Sunni Muslims; 
president Mustafa Batdiyev (since 2003)
Adygeya 
area: 7.6 thousand km2; 
location: western part of North Caucasus (encir-
cled by the territory of Krasnodar Krai); 
capital: Maikop (167 thousand); 
other large cities: Adygeysk (12 thousand); 
population: 447 thousand; 
ethnic make-up: Russians (68%), Adygeyans
(22%), Ukrainians (3.2%), Armenians (2.4%); 
religion: Orthodox Christians and Sunni Mus-
lims; 
president Khazret Sovmen (since 2002)
Stavropol Krai: 
area: 66.5 thousand km2; 
location: central part of North Caucasus; borders
on Rostov oblast, Krasnodar Krai, Karachay-Cher-
kessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Che-
chnya, Dagestan and Kalmykia; 
capital: Stavropol (346 thousand); 
other large cities: Piatigorsk (134 thousand),
Nevinnomysk (134 thousand), Kislovodsk (123
thousand) and Essentuki (99 thousand); 
population: 2.73 million; 
ethnic make-up: Russians (approx. 70%), Cauca-
sian peoples (approx. 30%, including Armenians,
Georgians, Azeris, Chechens, Dagestani peoples,
Karachays and others); 
religion: Orthodox Christians are the great ma-
jority, other religious groups include Sunni Mus-
lims; 
governor Aleksandr Chernogorov (since 1996)
Krasnodar Krai (Kuban)
area: 76 thousand km2; 
location: western part of North Caucasus by the
Black Sea; borders on Georgia (the territory of the
separatist Abkhazia), Adygeya, Karachay-Cher-
kessia, Stavropol Krai and Rostov oblast;
capital: Krasnodar (643 thousand); 
other large cities: Sochi (366 thousand), Novo-
rossiysk (205 thousand), Armavir (166 thousand); 
population: 5.1 million; 
ethnic make-up: Russians (approx. 80%), Cauca-
sian peoples (approx. 20%; mainly Armenians,
Georgians, Azeris, Abkhazians and others); 
religion: Orthodox Christians are the majority,
other religious groups include Muslims; 
governor Aleksandr Tkachov (since 2000)
Kalmykia: 
area: 76.1 thousand km2; 
location: north-eastern part of North Caucasus
by the Caspian Sea; borders on Dagestan, Stav-
ropol Krai and the oblasts of Rostov, Volgograd
and Astrakhan; 
capital: Elista (105 thousand); 
other large cities: Lagan (15 thousand); 
population: 292 thousand; 
ethnic make-up: Kalmyks (approx. 50%), Rus-
sians (approx. 40%); 
religion: Buddhists (Kalmyks) and Orthodox
Christians (Russians); 
president Kirsan Ilumzhinov (since 1993)
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1 According to the Russian terminology, Transcaucasia
(North Caucasus is also referred to as North Caucasia).
2 In some definitions, North Caucasus also includes the other
units of the southern federal district, created in 2000, its
central city being Rostov-on-Don, i.e. the Rostov, Astrakhan
and Volgograd oblasts. According to such a definition, the
North Caucasian region has the area of 582 thousand km2
(3.4% of the Russian Federation territory) and is inhabited by
more than 21 million people (14% of the population of the
Russian Federation); http://wgeo.ru/russia/okr_ugn.shtml
3 For more details on the events in Chechnya in 1991–1994
and on the causes of the so-called first Chechen war see: 
P. Grochmalski, Czeczenia: rys prawdziwy, Wroc∏aw: atla2
1999; A. Malashenko, D. Trenin, Vremia Yuga, Moscow: Mos-
kovskiy Centr Carnegie 2002; D. Furman, Rossiya i Chechnya,
obshchestva i gosudarstva, Moscow 1999; S. Ciesielski, Rosja
– Czeczenia. Dwa stulecia konfliktu, Wroc∏aw: Wydawnictwo
Uniwersytetu Wroc∏awskiego 2003.
4 For information on the so-called first Chechen war see:
Ibidem and: J. Cichocki, Wojna rosyjsko-czeczeƒska, CES Ma-
terials 1997.
5 The election was recognised as democratic and legal by
many international organisations (e.g. OSCE) and by Russia
itself.
6 For more information on the inter-war period see inter alia:
A. Malashenko, D. Trenin, op. cit., D. Furman, op. cit.; W. Góre-
cki, Czy Rosja straci∏a Kaukaz Pó∏nocny?, Week in the East,
28 December 1998; M. Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, Wa-
shington: Brookings Institution Press 2002.
7 Although the Russian authorities accused Chechens of the
attacks, it has not been cleared out until now who they in
fact were organised by. Many facts indicate that they could
have been staged by Russian special forces. This thesis is ad-
vanced among others by the former Federal Security Service
officer, Aleksandr Litvinenko in the book by Aleksandr Mik-
hailov: Chechenskoye koleso, Moscow: Sovershenno sekretno
2002 and by the Russian press baron Boris Berezovski (he
presented his views on this subject, inter alia, in the film
Blown up Russia). For information on the events in Dagestan
see inter alia: http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/N-Caucas/
conf2809.htm
8 In 2002, the compulsory returns of refugees from Ingu-
shetia to Chechnya began: by exerting administrative pres-
sure (gradually, all the refugee camps were liquidated), using
threats and promises of compensation payment, most of
the escapees were forced to leave. Currently, approximately
70 thousand refugees are staying in Ingushetia. For infor-
mation on the current situation of Chechen refugees in
Russia see: http://www.memo.ru/hr/refugees/doklad2004/
chech04.htm
9 For information on violation of human rights in Chechnya
by the Russian army see inter alia: Memorial o voyne na Se-
vernom Kavkaze http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/caucas1/
index.htm; http://www.hrw.org/russian/editorials/chechnya/
index.html
10 Chechenisation (a press term) was officially referred to by
the Russian authorities as a „peacekeeping process in the
Chechen Republic”. For more information on particular sta-
ges of the Chechenisation policy see: A. Makarkin, Uzako-
nennaya chechenizatsiya, http://www.politcom.ru/2002/
pvz10.php; A. Makarkin, Gibel Kadyrova i sudba checheni-
zatsiyi, http://www.politcom.ru/2004/pvz417.php; N. Serova,
Tri problemy chechenizatsiyi, http://www.politcom.ru
11 The most significant armed operations of the militants in
2004 included: the assassination of Akhmad Kadyrov at the
stadium in Grozny (9 May), the attack on Ingushetia (at night
on 21/22 June), in which nearly 100 people were killed and
the raid on Grozny (at night on 21/22 August); in late August/
early September, there also happened three awful terrorist
attacks: the blowing up of 2 airplanes in southern Russia
(24 August; 90 people were killed), the suicide bombing at
Rizhskaya metro station in Moscow (31 August; 11 people
killed) and the seizure of the school in Beslan, North Ossetia
(the worst terrorist attack in the Russian history; during
the assault on the terrorist-controlled school, which was
launched in unclear circumstances, nearly 350 people were
killed, including several hundred children). Shamil Basayev
admitted he was the author of all those attacks on one of
the Chechen separatistsí websites www.kavkazcenter.com
12 It cannot be excluded that the assassination of Akhmad
Kadyrov was staged by the military, as his strong authority
started to challenge their position in the republic. Kadyrov
openly criticised the army for prosecution of civilian popu-
lation and demanded limiting their powers in the republic.
13 This mainly concerns representatives of the so-called Ka-
dyrov’s clan, the leader of which is a son of the assassinated
president, Ramzan Kadyrov (currently deputy prime minis-
ter of Chechnya). The security service, which he is in charge
of, terrorises the local residents and commits crimes on a
mass scale.
14 The Dubrovka attack (October 2002) was a harbinger of
the introduction of new methods into the military actions.
Since that time, Chechens have executed tens of terrorist
attacks and armed raids outside the territory of Chechnya.
For statistical data on the worst terrorist attacks since Octo-
ber 2002 see: M. Falkowski, Nowa fala terroru w Rosji, Week
in the East, 2 September 2004.
15 Maskhadov admitted among other things having launched
the attack on Ingushetia this June. Then, he also promised
subsequent military actions would be conducted in the ter-
ritory of Russia.
16 The ideological changes in the militant camp have been
described among others by the journalist of Radio Svoboda,
Andrei Babitsky in his recent reports from Chechnya (see:
www.svoboda.org).
17 This is mainly a result of the growing Caucasophobia and
Islamophobia in Russia. For more thorough analysis of these
problems see: A. Malashenko, D. Trenin, op. cit., pages 57–62;
A. Levinson, Kavkaz podo mnoiu, http://www.polit.ru/docs/
618834.html; A. Gorbova, My nie shakhidki, Novye Izvestia,
01.10.2004.
18 The death squadrons kidnapped and killed among others
the deputy prosecutor of Ingushetia Rashid Ozdoyev, who
had been making attempts to oppose their illicit actions;
this affair is thoroughly described in the opposition website
www.ingushetiya.ru; see also: A. Politkovskaya, Mestona-
khozhdenie zakona ne ustanovleno, Novaya Gazeta,
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02–04.08.2004; FSB pokhishchayet ludei v Dagestane,
http://yaseen.ru/politica/fsb.htm
19 The views of the young elite of Caucasus (mostly of Da-
gestan), which are evolving fast towards Islam, can be read
on the website www.yaseen.ru
20 The most numerous of them are the troops commanded
by Rappani Khalilov and Rasul Makasharipov (Dagestan) and
Magomed Yevloyev (Ingushetia).
21 For information on the war spilling over the neighbour-
ing republics see inter alia: A. Riskin, M. Bondarenko, N. Po-
pova, Nowoye podbrushye Rossii, Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
20.08.2004; A. Magomedov, Dagestan na grani, http://
yaseen.ru/politica/dag_na_grani.htm; O. Allerova, Dalshe
budut Dagestan, Kabarda i Karachayevo-Cherkessia, Kom-
mersant, 28.06.2004; S. Gomzikova, A. Riskin, Kavkaz ras-
strelnyi, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 01.10.2003; I. Sukhov, Eto
privediot k bolszoi krovi, Vremia Novostei, 03.09.2004.
22 For more information on the Chechen problem in Dage-
stan see: Y. Kulchik, A. Adilsultanov, Chechentsi-Akkintsi
(Aukhovtsi) i ikh grazhdanskiye formirovaniya, http://www.
igpi.ru/bibl/igpi_publ/dag_akk/chechen.html; A. Aliyev,
Chechentsi-Akkintsi Dagestana, Makhachkala 1993.
23 For more information on the ethnic conflicts in Dagestan
see: E. Kisriyev, Dagestan: prichiny konfliktov i faktory sta-
bilnosti, Centralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz, http://www.ca-c.org/
journal/cac-10-2000/20.kisriev.shtml; M. Savva, Konfliktnyi
potentsial mezhetnicheskikh otnosheniy na Severnom Kav-
kaze, Centralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz no. 3/2004.
24 E.g. Nadirshakh Khachilaev, the leader of the Lak national
movement and thereafter advocate of creation of an Islamic
republic in dagestan, who was murdered in August 2003, or
the well-known Magomedsalikh Gusaev, who was considered
as a potential successor of Magomedov, killed in the same
month. For the story of the charismatic Khachilaev see:
Komu mogla byt’ nuzhna smert’ Nadirshakha Khachilaeva?,
http://www.politcom.ru/2003/gvozd181.php
25 For more information on the power distribution system
in Dagestan see: Vvedeniye posta presidenta v Dagestane,
http://www.svoboda.org/programs/cauc/2004/cauc.021804.
asp; K. Kazenin, Krepok li tyl Rossii na Kavkaze? Chast’ 1,
http://www.regnum.ru/allnews/326969.html
26 Among others, Saigidpasha Umakhanov, mayor of Kha-
savyurt; Gadji Makhachev, deputy to the Russian Duma;
Ramazan Abdulatipov, member of the Federation Council of
Saratov oblast. While Magomedov, who is still supported
by the Kremlin, has taken actions to secure his own victory
in the approaching election (e.g. removing representatives
of local authorities who are disloyal to him), the opposition,
among whom Umakhanov has taken the lead, has promi-
sed it will prevent his re-election. In late July/early August
2004, there was serious unrest in Khasavyurt, during which
Umakhanov demanded that Magomedov should step down
and early elections should be held. 
27 For information on the power struggle in Dagestan dur-
ing the recent months see: S. Samoilova, Dagestan: krizis
klanovoi sistemy, http://www.politcom.ru/2004/zloba4596.
php; A. Riskin, Raskol Dagestana stanovitsia realnostiu, Ne-
zavisimaya Gazeta, 17.08.2004.
28 For more information on the so-called Lezgin issue see: 
E. Kisriyev, op. cit.
29 The conflict genesis dates back to 1944, when Ingushes
and Chechens were displaced and forced to settle in Central
Asia. The prigorodnyi district, which had earlier belonged to
the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, was then made a part of North
Ossetia, and Ossetians began settling on the Ingush land.
Ingushes have never accepted this state of affairs. For more
information see: http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/caucas1/
left41.htm; A. Dzadziyev, A. Dzarasov, Po zniesieniu stanu
wyjàtkowego, Eurazja no. 1/1996, CES.
30 Severnaya Osetiya – Ingushetiya: posledstviye terroris-
ticheskogo akta w Beslane, http://www.memo.ru/hr/hot
points/caucas1/prigorod/rubr/1/index.htm; Ivan Sukhow,
Ogneopasnyi raion, Vremia Novostei, 06.09.2004.
31 Similarly to Chechens and Ingushes, Balkars and Kara-
chays had been displaced to Central Asia in the 40’s. While
they had been living in Kazakhstan, Kabardins and Circas-
sians had settled on their land, which caused serious con-
flicts after the return of Balkars and Karachays from exile.
32 The muhajir were those residents of Caucasus, who were
forced by the Tsarist authorities to emigrate to Turkey and
the Middle East after the end of the Caucasian war in the
19th century (they were mostly (Circassians, Chechens and
Dagestanis).
33 For more information on the conflicts in the western part
of Caucasus see: K. Kazenin, Krepok li tyl Rossii na Severnom
Kavkaze? Chast’ 3. Informatsionnoye Agentstvo Regnum,
http://www.regnum.ru 
34 Situatsiya v Karachayevo-Cherkessii posle vyborov;
http://www.memo.ru/hr/news/karach3.htm; M. Bondarenko,
Zharkiy iyul dla Karachayevo-Cherkessii, Nezavisimaya Ga-
zeta, 14.03.2004.
35 According to calculations made by Alexei Malashenko of
the Moscow Carnegie Centre, approximately 4 million Mus-
lims, i.e. one fourth of all the Muslims in Russia, live in North
Caucasus. A. Malashenko, Islamskiye orientiry Severnogo
Kavkaza, Moscow: Moskovskiy Centr Carnegie 2001.
36 Members of Kadiriya brotherhood e.g. played a great role
in the radicalisation of the Chechen separatists under the
rule of Jokhar Dudayev, and one of the Dagestani sheikhs,
Said-efendi of Chirkey, is one of the key figures in the repub-
lic, who de facto controls the SA of Muslims in Dagestan. For
more information on the North Caucasian Sufism see: 
A. Shykhsaidov, Islam v Dagestane, Centralnaya Aziya i Kav-
kaz no. 5/1997; A. Malashenko, Islamskiye orientiry..., op.
cit; Y. Chesnov, Sufizm i etnicheskiy mentalitet chechentsev,
Rasy i Narody, no. 26/2001.
37 In the Soviet times, many Muslim clergymen, similarly to
Russian Orthodox priests, collaborated with KGB. For this
reason, they are not really respected by people. For more
information on the traditional Islam see: S. Berezhnoy, I Do-
bayev (edited), Islam i islamizm na yuge Rossii, Yuzhno-
rossiyskoye Obozreniye no. 11/2002; K. Kazenin, Prizrak wah-
habizma, Vremia Novostei, 09.01.2003.
38 For more information on the Wahhabi movement in North
Caucasus see: V. Akayev, Islamskiy fundamentalism na Se-
vernom Kavkaze: mif i realnost, Centralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz,
no. 9/2000., A. Malashenko, Islamskiye orientiry..., op. cit.
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39 The first Islamic organisation in the USSR to opt for reform
of Islam was the Islamic Rebirth Party, founded in 1990 in
Astrakhan. Among its founding fathers were many Dage-
stanians, including the key ideologist of Wahhabis, Bagaut-
din Kebedov. 
40 Both in Russian and international opinion, this was con-
sidered barbarian (inter alia, several public executions in
Grozny were shown), meanwhile, according to many scien-
tists, among others Vladimir Bobrovnikov of the Russian
Academy of Sciences, Shariah could have had very positive
effects on the security and stability in Caucasus. See: V. Bo-
brovnikov, Islamofobia i religioznoye zakonodatelstvo v Da-
gestane, Centralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz, http://www.ca-c.org/
journal/cac-08-2000/15.bobrovn.shtml, V. Bobrovnikov,
http://www.carnegie.ru/ru/pubs/books/volume/36592.htm
41 In many cases, activities of Chechen commanders (e.g.
trade in people) had nothing to do with Islam. There is evi-
dence proving that some Wahhabi groups, whose actual
main activity is kidnapping people for ransom, are supported
by Federal Security Service to destabilise the situation in
Chechnya (Russian services supported inter alia the groups
of Arbi Barayev and of brothers Akhmadov).
42 Many terrorist attacks in south Russia have been staged
not by Chechens but by Wahhabis from other republics.
43 According to official data, the population of the entire
North Caucasus grew by nearly 1 million in 1992–1999, 
V. Beloziorov, Migratsionniye processy na Severnom Kavkaze,
http://www.polit.ru/country/2003/08/12/622836.html
44 V. Beloziorov, Rusifikatsiya i derusifikatsiya: etnicheskaya
karta Kavkaza vchera i siegodnia, Moscow: OGI 2003.
45 Persecutions in Krasnodar Krai especially painfully affected
the community of Meskhetin Turks (several ten thousand
people), who after their driving out of Uzbekistan (they had
been deported there in 1943 upon an order of Joseph Stalin
from the Georgian Meskhetia) started settling there, Ochered-
noye izbiyeniye turok na Kubani, Informatsionnoye Agent-
stvo Regnum of 17 January 2000, Mikhail Savva, Meskhe-
tians head for America, http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?
archive/cau/cau_200408_246_2_eng.txt
46 The most widespread form of harassment is causing pro-
blems with getting the so-called propiska (permanent resi-
dence registration) and registration (temporary residence
registration) as well as forcing out protection money from
entrepreneurs and small traders of non-Russian national
background.
47 See inter alia: M. Nersesian, Southern Russia’s migrants
force deportation, http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/
cau/cau_200303_172_3_eng.txt; A. Nikolayev, Kuban dla
kubanoidov, http://www.polit.ru/world/2003/09/12/624815.
html; M. Bondarenko, Migranty ne dolzhny zhyt vozle stra-
tegicheskikh obiektov, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14.04.2003.
48 http://echo.msk.ru/7news/archive/197224.html
49 According to official data, the average monthly income
per person in North Caucasus is 65% of the general Russian
mean, the average wages are 1.5 times lower than in the
other parts of the Russian Federation, and 35% of all the
Russian unemployed live in the region; http:///www.gzt.ru/
rubricator_text.gzt?rubric=novosti&id=64050700000030
580; 
50 For more information on the demographic processes taking
place in North Caucasus see: http://demoscope.ru/weekly/
2004/0157/analit05.php; http://www.mhg.ru/publications/
3DDF634
51 N. Agayeva, Dagestan’s capital bursts with migrants,
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/cau/cau_200406_23
6_4_eng.txt
52 I. Maksakov, Kavkazskiy barometr, Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
18.03.2002; V. Gavrikov, Biznes kavkazskoi natsionalnosti,
Profil, 25.12.2000.
53 For more information on the socioeconomic situation in
Caucasus see: http://www.kavkaz.memo.ru.
54 Alkhanov allegedly won over 70% votes, with the turn-
out exceeding 80%. However, independent journalists and
human rights activists claim that not more than 20% of
Chechens cast their ballots. 
55 The hysterical and highly emotional reactions of Russia’s
representatives (including president Putin) any time the
Chechen issue is raised by Western politicians or journal-
ists prove how painful a problem Chechnya is for Moscow. 
56 I.e. de facto a war, though the current conflict in Chechnya
has never been called a war. Instead, the term “antiterror-
ist operation” is used.
57 For more information on the development of terrorism in
Russia see: M. Falkowski, Skàd si´ wzià∏ terroryzm w Rosji?,
Week in the East, 22 January 2004.
58 In Chechnya alone, nearly 80 thousand officers of the
Russian law enforcement agencies are stationed, more than
a half of which are soldiers of the federal army (the other
units report to inter alia the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Federal Security Service). As a total, the North Caucasian Mi-
litary District has more than 102 thousand soldiers (of the
Russian Ground Forces alone), which accounts for 10% of
the total professional staff of the Russian army and as much
as 32% of the Ground Forces. 
59 CES News, 15 September 2004.
60 For many Russian generals Chechnya has meant the
beginning of their political career; e.g. Gen. Viktor Kazan-
tsev, former commander of the federal forces in Caucasus,
in 2000–2004, was the Russian president’s envoy to the
southern federal district, Gen. Vladimir Shamanov, former
commander of the 58th Army in Chechnya, is the governor of
Ulyanovsk oblast, Gen. Konstantin Pulikovsky, former com-
mander of Russian forces in Chechnya (during the first war)
is the Russian president’s envoy to the far-east federal dis-
trict, etc. 
61 For more information see: W. Górecki, E. Paszyc, Walka 
o czeczeƒskà rop´, Week in the East, 4 January 2001.
62 The election results in the Caucasian republics are always
incredibly good for the Kremlin, and the turnout is very high.
E.g. in this March presidential election, in Dagestan the
turnout was allegedly 94.09% (94.61% voted for Putin), in
Ingushetia 96.22% (98.28% for Putin) and in Chechnya 94%
(92.3% for Putin). Such results indicate that the elections
are evidently fixed there, http://kavkaz.memo.ru/reginfotext/
reginfo/id/656852.html
63 The only contact between the Kremlin and the separa-
tists were the talks between president Maskhadov’s envoy
Akhmad Zakayev and of the Russian president’s envoy to
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the southern federal district, Gen. Viktor Kazantsev, which
were held in December 2001 at Sheremetievo airport in
Moscow. Due to the negative attitude of the Kremlin to fur-
ther talks, they have not been continued. 
64 Ziazikov, who has been forced upon Ingushes, is so un-
popular that eruption of serious social unrest in Ingushetia
cannot be excluded in the nearest future (the opposition
has many a time promised active undertakings to remove
him from power). 
65 The Kremlin’s propaganda of success in Chechnya has
not overlooked even such a field as sports: president Putin
himself has engaged in this by meeting several times with
Terek Grozny football team (by the way playing outside of
Chechnya) after the Chechen club had won the Cup of Russia. 
66 It is impossible for western journalists to legally get into
Chechnya, and most Russian journalists stick to the autho-
rities’ directives on proper selection of information on Che-
chnya. Noticeable is the clear difference between the first
and the second Chechen wars: during the conflict in
1994–1996, journalists used to go to Chechnya unimpeded,
and their independent and critical reports contributed to
ending the first war (the Russian public, who were infor-
med in an unbiased way, were definitely against the con-
tinuation of the war). 
67 The mass media which the Kremlin uses for its propa-
ganda concerning the situation in North Caucasus include:
TV stations ORT and RTR, Rossiyskaya Gazeta daily newspa-
per (http://www.rg.ru), and the websites: www.strana.ru,
www.kavkaz.strana.ru, www.chechnyafree.ru, www.utro.ru,
www.rian.ru and other.
68 For information on the negative effect of the situation in
Chechnya on Russia see: M. Falkowski, Chechnya and Rus-
sia: The significance of the Chechen problem for contempo-
rary Russia, CES Studies, August 2003.
69 L. Radikhovsky, Zakon sokhraneniya energii, http://www.
politcom.ru/2004/pvz486.php
70 The tendency is noticeable, although, for the time being,
it is difficult to assess its real scale. It, however, cannot be
excluded that in the future the idea of Caucasian solidarity,
which failed in the 90’s, will revive owing to the religious
unity of Caucasian nations.
71 An example of lack of identification with the Russian sta-
te can be the results of conscription to the army in North
Caucasian republics, for instance, in 2003, in Chirkey, one of
the largest Dagestani villages in Buinaksk district, out of the
197 conscripts only 4 could be drafted in due time; http://
www.regnum.ru/allnews/199836.html. The intensifying
anti-Russian sentiments, the growing feeling of being dis-
tinct from the rest of Russia and of Caucasian solidarity, as
well as the increasingly faster Islamisation of the region are
also reflected in the trends dominating in the cultural
works of young residents of Caucasus, such as Chechen
bards (Timur Mutsurayev, Imam Alimsultanov and others)
popular in the entire region, and of many Caucasian musi-
cians, writers and poets. 
72 See: J. Rogo˝a, Putin after re-election, current issue of the
CES Studies.
73 This forecast is based on the assumption that the current
tendencies will persist in the region for at least ten years or
even several decades. It also seems that such a scenario
would only have been possible in the case of a radical
change of both the ruling team and the political system in
Russia. Most of the Russian public seems not to be against
such a turn of events: already today, the number of sup-
porters of withdrawing the troops from Chechnya and sep-
aration of the republic from Russia (to get rid of an unnec-
essary area which absorbs enormous funds and where hun-
dreds of Russian soldiers die) is relatively high. 
74 Even though problems of North Caucasus are very sig-
nificant for Russia, still they must not be overrated, as
there exist many other important issues, the meaning of
which is equally important for the future of the Russian
Federation. 
75 Already today, a few dozen thousand Chechen refugees
live in European Union countries, and their number is con-
stantly growing; nearly 4 thousand Chechens annually
apply for being granted the refugee status in such coun-
tries as Austria, Czech Republic or Poland. 
76 Since 1994, nearly 1 million young Russians coming from
all the regions of the country have served in Chechnya. Most
of them are unable to normally function in the society. 
77 Data on all the republics, according to: http://wgeo.ru/
russia/okr_ugn.shtml; http://kavkaz.memo.ru/encyclopedia/;
http://www.c-s-r.ru/rusinfo/sev-kavkaz.htm 65
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Abbreviations: N.O. – North Ossetia; S.O. – South Ossetia; ING. – Ingushetia
